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 1. Introduction 
The rise and subsequent collapse in housing prices in many countries since the mid-1990s has 
been of an unprecedented magnitude. In the US, housing prices rose by around 86% (in real 
terms) between 1996 and 2006 (and by around 50% in the six-year-period ending in 2006), 
before falling by 30% in the years that followed (Shiller, 2007). In Spain - the focus of this 
study - the boom was even more spectacular, with a real price increase of about 150% for the 
whole period, and of 90% in the period 2000 to 2006 (Ministerio de Fomento, 
www.fomento.es).  
The crisis had a particularly adverse effect on public finances, above all in places 
heavily reliant on cyclical revenue sources (Ter-Minassian and Fedelino, 2010). Given that 
the current crisis has been strongly conditioned by the collapse in the housing market, 
governments overly reliant on housing-related tax revenues have been hit hardest (Martínez-
Vázquez et al., 2010). In the US, the question as to whether its property tax revenues are 
affected by the housing construction cycle has been raised, with a number of recent papers 
concluding that the impact of the contraction in this market, while varying across states, has 
not, in general, been especially acute (see Doerner and Ihlanfeldt, 2011; Lutz et al., 2011; 
Alm et al., 2011; and Skidmore and Scorsone, 2011). While the stability shown by Spain’s 
local property tax is quite remarkable, the country’s regional and local governments obtain 
revenues from a number of additional housing-related sources (see section 2 for more details). 
In most instances, these sources do not depend on the stock of housing (as the property tax) 
but rather on the flow of housing construction (the case of the land transaction tax1), which 
makes them particularly volatile. Regional and local government revenues generated by 
housing construction have been estimated to have fallen by two thirds in the first two years of 
the property crash (Solé-Ollé and Viladecans, 2011). Thus, in Spain, the bursting of the 
housing bubble was accompanied by a burst in the housing-construction revenue bubble. 
The impact of the collapse suffered by these sources of revenues on local budgeting 
during the crisis years depended to a great extent on just how the governments had behaved 
during the boom. Governments that had dedicated these revenues to current spending (in 
particular, to meeting staff wage bills) had to face a more painful adjustment than those that 
had used them to finance capital projects, build up reserves, or reduce their overall debt (see, 
for example, Sobel and Holcombe, 1996). Fully forward-looking governments, aware that 
these revenue flows would not last indefinitely, chose to save, while others were tempted to 
                                                 
1 Land transaction taxes have rarely been studied in the literature. See Dachis et al. (2011)for a recent exception. 
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 spend. It is, therefore, somewhat surprising that recent studies examining the impact of the 
housing cycle on local public finances (see, for example, Alm et al., 2011 and Lutz et al., 
2011) have focused principally on the situation during the period of contraction, largely 
ignoring the fact that the seeds of the current problem were sown during the boom years. In 
other words, while the revenue shortfall is a major concern, in many cases the problem stems 
from the use governments made of these revenues during the boom years. 
In Spain, it is widely recognized that local governments over-spent from their housing 
construction revenues during the boom and they faced financial problems during the bust. A 
common media description of what happened during this period was: 
 “The municipalities, indebted and without the necessary flow of income from 
their revenues, see in housing construction their main and most tempting source 
of finance.”   
(El País, 10/6/2006) 
 
“‘If this was a firm, it would have closed down by now’, said the city mayor. 
Services have been stopped, payments to workers and suppliers have been 
delayed for months. Even the members of the council are not being paid. The 
bursting of the real estate bubble has hit the council hard and real estate revenues 
have fallen by 96%, resulting in technical bankruptcy.”   
(Eleconomista.es, 10/2/2011) 
 
It is difficult to assess just how widespread this situation is given the heterogeneity of  
Spain’s local government bodies, the lags in the disclosure of their financial information, and 
the tendency of the media to focus on the most extreme cases. In this paper we examine the 
first part of these events, i.e. the spending behavior of Spain’s municipal governments during 
the boom years. In so doing, we seek to answer the following questions: (i) What proportion 
of the extraordinary local revenues generated during the boom was actually spent? (ii) Did the 
tendency to spend from these revenues become more widespread as the housing boom 
intensified? (iii) Was this spending behavior particularly prevalent in the case of the revenues 
generated by housing construction (that is, did this constitute the ‘most tempting’ source of 
revenue)? 
To answer these questions, we study whether local spending decisions were consistent 
with forward-looking behavior. In so doing, we follow the framework proposed by Campbell 
and Mankiw (1990), as subsequently applied to sub-national governments by Holtz-Eakin et 
al. (1994), Dalhberg and Lindström (1998) and Borge and Tovmo (2009). Forward-looking 
behavior means that spending decisions are determined by permanent revenues, and that the 
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 deficit will absorb any temporary shocks. Any increases in spending should follow a random 
walk, being insensitive to any predictable increases in revenue. In this basic framework, the 
sensitivity of spending to revenue increases is, thus, interpreted as evidence of a departure 
from forward-looking behavior, although other interpretations are discussed in the literature 
(including, credit constraints and risk-hedging); see, for example, Luengo-Prado and 
Sørensen, 2008). In this paper, we estimate the degree of sensitivity of local spending to 
predictable revenue increases, and argue that this result might also be due (at least in part) to 
the effect of the high growth that construction-related revenues experienced during the 
housing boom.  
We draw on spending and revenue data (1994-2006) for more than a thousand Spanish 
municipalities in order to estimate an equation that relates the change in spending to the 
change in revenues, instrumenting this variable with spending and revenue lags. Then, so as 
to provide evidence of the link between the sensitivity of spending to revenue changes and the 
housing boom, we examine whether the effect became more marked as the housing boom 
intensified (i.e., between 2001 and 2006) and whether it was stronger in more dynamic 
housing markets. We also examine whether the response presented by spending to changes in 
revenues was greater for housing-construction revenues than was the case for ordinary 
revenues, and whether this differential effect changed as the boom intensified. The main 
findings of the paper are: (i) Predictable changes in revenues have a substantial effect on 
spending, suggesting that Spanish local governments are not fully forward-looking agents. (ii) 
This effect increased as the housing boom intensified and was more evident in housing 
markets that presented the steepest trends in housing prices. (iii) At the beginning of the 
period, housing-construction revenues had just as strong an effect on spending as did ordinary 
revenues, but this difference disappeared as the boom intensified, above all in the most 
dynamic housing markets.  
We discuss several explanations for these results. Firstly, the political economy 
literature suggests that the availability of a growing revenue pool could intensify the fight for 
budget resources, making it quite difficult for a local authority not to spend its budget 
surpluses (e.g., Talvi and Vegh, 2005; Alesina et al., 2010). Secondly, the increased 
sensitivity of spending to revenue changes as the boom accelerates might reflect the fact that 
revenue expectations are not fully rational; rather, politicians suffer from ‘extrapolation bias’, 
being excessively influenced by recent events and failing to take into sufficient account that 
the good or lean times cannot last forever (see, for example, Fuster et al., 2010). Finally, the 
4
 lower degree of sensitivity of spending to changes in housing-construction revenues can be 
explained by the fact these revenues are highly irregular, being kept in all likelihood in a 
different “mental account” and spent with more restraint (e.g., Shefrin & Thaler, 1988).  
The paper is organized as follows. In the next section we provide a more detailed 
explanation of the role of housing construction revenues in the financing of Spanish local 
governments and of the effects of the housing cycle on the evolution of these revenues. In 
section three, we discuss the theoretical arguments that might help to interpret our results. In 
section four, we describe the methodology and the database. In section five we present the 
results. The last section concludes.  
 
2. Local budgets and the housing boom 
2.1 Local budgets in Spain 
Spain consists of more than eight thousand municipalities, although most of them are quite 
small. These municipalities are multi-purpose governments, and their main expenditure 
categories cover the traditional responsibilities assigned elsewhere to the local public sector 
(i.e., environmental services, urban planning, transportation, welfare, etc.) with the exception 
of education, for which Spain’s regional governments have responsibility. Local 
government’s own revenues account for more than 65% of current budget revenues (as of 
2006), with the remaining 35% being met by grants, most of which are unconditional. Two 
thirds of the municipality’s own revenues are derived from taxes, with the remaining third 
coming from a variety of user charges. The main taxes are the Property tax, the Local 
business tax and the Local vehicle tax, which account for 50, 15 and 15% of tax revenues, 
respectively. These revenue sources, referred to as Ordinary revenues in the rest of the paper, 
have traditionally been quite stable2.  
However, Spanish municipalities also obtain revenues from what we refer to as 
Extraordinary revenues, most of which are related to housing construction. Here, 
municipalities levy two further taxes: the Construction tax and the Land transactions tax. 
Unlike Ordinary taxes, which are dependent on stocks (i.e. assessed value of business, cars or 
houses), these taxes depend on flows. The Construction tax is paid by the owners of a 
                                                 
2 The Local business tax and Local vehicle tax are license-type taxes, meaning that revenues are affected by the 
number of taxpayers but not by the evolution in the amounts filed by each taxpayer. The Property tax is also 
quite stable, property assessment being carried out every ten years, new values being introduced progressively, 
and with no past experiences of reassessments lowering values. The design of unconditional grants also ensures 
that they remain stable (see Bosch and Solé-Ollé, 2005). 
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 building under construction in the jurisdiction of the municipality, the tax being levied at a 
rate that is a proportional to the cost of the project. The Land transactions tax is paid by the 
seller of plot of land (empty or built upon); the tax rate is proportional and the tax base is an 
estimate based on the assessed value of the land and the number of years since the last 
purchase. Obviously, when the amount of new construction work is in decline, the revenue 
generated by the two taxes falls sharply. Then, there are the fees paid by developers or by land 
owners. Developers’ fees include Building licenses and payments made in exchange for other 
types of development-related duties3. Land owner duties are Impact fees used to pay for 
improvements in already existing urban infrastructures. Finally, municipalities also obtain 
revenue from Sales of land plots donated by the developers, and from Capital transfers, 
earmarked for specific infrastructure projects.  
Some comments on the nature of these revenues are worth making at this juncture. First, 
most of these sources are supposed to be used in the financing of new infrastructure. In 
theory, the amount raised should match the cost of building that infrastructure (Slack, 2002; 
Peterson, 2008). If this were the case, no windfall would result. However, this principle is of 
limited application in Spain, since developers’ obligations include the direct funding of some 
of this infrastructure (e.g. streets), as well as lump-sum donations (in land or in money) that 
are not computed to match the cost of urban infrastructure. This means that, although on 
occasions these contributions fail to meet the infrastructure financing requirements, more 
often than not they generate windfall revenues, especially during housing booms4. Second, 
while some of these revenue sources are earmarked for capital expenses, some are not (see 
Solé-Ollé and Viladecans, 2011). Spanish local budgeting regulations clearly state that both 
Sales of land plots, Capital transfers and Impact Fees should form part of the capital budget, 
and so cannot be used to fund current expenditure5. The rule is less clear for Developers’ fees 
and while some municipalities adopt sound practices, others do not. Finally, revenues from 
                                                 
3 For instance, in Spain developers are obliged to provide basic infrastructure (e.g. streets, sewage systems, 
lighting), but the municipality can do this directly having first reached an agreement with the developer. 
Developers are also obliged to give the municipality a part of the developed land (that required for streets plus 10 
to 25% of the value of the developed land plots), to be used for public facilities (schools, hospitals), for open 
space, or on which to build social housing. Developers and the city council can reach an agreement to exchange 
land plots for additional money payments (see Riera et al., 1991). 
4 A recent World Bank report discussing the desirability of using land-based financing instruments also warned 
of the possibility that these revenues might spill over the current budget during housing booms (see Peterson, 
2008). 
5 Note, however, that even in this case a windfall originating from such a source could result in higher current 
spending if the municipality is running an operating surplus (i.e. a lower surplus will be needed to fund the same 
level of investment while issuing the same level of debt). 
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 the two housing construction taxes form part of the current budget, despite their great 
variability.  
 
2.2 The effects of the housing boom 
The impact of the last housing boom on the composition of the revenue budget of Spain’s 
municipalities is illustrated in Table 1. Data are shown for the years 1994 and 2006. The table 
shows that between the lowest point and the peak in the cycle, Extraordinary revenues 
increased by almost 10% of non-financial revenues (from 19 to 29%), and that this growth 
was mostly attributable to the increase in the share generated by Housing construction 
revenues. The component of Housing construction revenues that increased most was the Sales 
of land plots, which saw its budget share increase threefold (from 2.2 to 6.6%). Housing tax 
revenues also increased substantially, from 5.4 to 9% of the budget. 
[Insert Table 1] 
The rise in Housing construction revenues is even more evident if we examine their 
evolution over the period. In Figure 1 we can see how they increased more than threefold in 
real terms during the boom, before losing nine tenths of their value during the contraction. In 
2010, these sources accounted for around 70% of the revenues that they had been providing in 
1994 when the boom began. This pattern closely matches the one presented by the number of 
building permits issued, which increased fourfold during the expansion and fell to 40% of its 
initial value by 2010. The rise in real housing prices (see Figure 1) also provides a good 
match with the evolution in Housing construction revenues during the boom, but not during 
the period of contraction. The reason for this is that most of these tax bases depend on the 
actual housing transactions taking place; if there are no transactions, there are no revenues 
regardless of whether prices are high or low; if there are transactions, higher prices will 
generate more revenues.  
The expansion period can be divided into two different sub-periods. During the first one 
of these (before 2002), housing construction rates grew quite rapidly but stagnated towards 
the end of the sub-period, while housing prices grew just moderately throughout these years. 
As a result of these two forces, Housing construction revenues also grew throughout the 
period but at rates that were much lower than in the second sub-period. After 2002, both 
housing construction rates and housing prices grew extremely rapidly, and as a result the 
growth trend in Housing construction revenues was also much steeper.  
7
 [Insert Figures 1 & 2] 
The evolution in the various components of the housing-construction revenues was even 
more spectacular, with revenues from Sales of land plots and Housing construction taxes 
growing at a rate above the average (see Figure 2). Housing construction fees also grew, but 
not at such a spectacular rate. By contrast, Figure 2 shows that the evolution in               
revenues from Ordinary revenues remained largely stable6. This is an important factor to bear 
in mind: the effect of the housing boom on revenue growth was extraordinary only in the case 
of Housing construction revenues. These revenues grew at an annual rate of 14.6%, while 
Ordinary revenues grew at just 5.4%. Furthermore, the acceleration in growth in the second 
sub-period (after 2001) was much more apparent in the case of Housing construction 
revenues (with annual growth rates of 6.5% and 18.7% in 1996-2001 and 2002-2006, 
respectively) than it was in that of Ordinary revenues (with growth rates of 4.8% and 6.4%, 
respectively). 
 
3. Interpretative framework 
3.1. Are politicians forward-looking agents? 
Our benchmark for analyzing the spending decisions of local governments is the purely 
rational forward-looking model. Rational local planners are assumed to choose public 
consumption to maximize an inter-temporal utility function, reflecting the preferences of a 
representative voter, subject to a budget constraint. If, in addition to this, politicians are able 
to foresee the future evolution of revenues perfectly, then the following expression for public 
consumption growth holds (see Hall, 1978): 
                                                             ttC εμ +=Δ     ,                                                        (1) 
where tC  is consumption of non-durable goods and services, t is the year, μ  is a constant 
which identifies such factors as the interest rate and time preferences, and tε  is a random 
error term which can be interpreted as the innovation between time t-1 and time t in total 
‘permanent revenues’. This implies that consumption growth is a random walk and that no 
variables known at the beginning of t-1 should have an effect on consumption growth. Thus, a 
potential test as to whether local politicians are fully forward-looking agents would involve 
regressing consumption on information known in t-1. Holtz-Eakin and Rosen (1991 and 
                                                 
6 Although not shown here, the evolution in the various taxes making up Ordinary taxes, as well as that of 
Current transfers, was quite similar to the average behavior presented by the group. 
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 1993) use this approach (see, for example, Hall, 1978) to test whether the lag structure is 
consistent with forward-looking behavior in the case of labor and capital spending by US 
municipalities7. Their results suggest that small municipalities do behave fairly rationally, but 
that this is not the case of big cities. A weakness inherent to this approach, however, is the 
lack of information it provides about the degree of departure from rational behavior. 
A method that serves to overcome this shortcoming was proposed by Campbell and 
Mankiw (1990). Their model nests two possible behaviors, rational and ‘myopic’, in a single 
equation. Consumption growth for rational ‘forward-looking’ politicians would follow 
expression (1). ‘Myopic’ local planners would consume all of their current yearly revenues, 
meaning that consumption growth would match current revenue growth (i.e., tt RC Δ=Δ ). 
These two behaviors can be nested in one equation by assuming that a proportion λ of local 
governments tend to act ‘myopically’ (or that the typical government acts ‘myopically’ a λ % 
of the time):  
                                                          tutRtC +Δ+=Δ λη                       ,                             (2) 
where μλη )1( −=  and ttu ελ)1( −= . A problem encountered when estimating this equation 
is that tRΔ might be correlated with the innovation in permanent income, thereby biasing the 
estimation of λ. The direction of the bias is unknown8. Overcoming this problem requires the 
use of instrumental variables techniques. Since the error term in (2) is the innovation to 
‘permanent revenues’, variables dated t-1 or before should not be correlated with ‘permanent 
revenues’ and as such constitute potentially good instruments. The paper by Holtz-Eakin et al. 
(1994) was the first to apply this methodology to local government data. Using aggregate 
state and local spending in the US, they were able to reject the hypothesis that politicians 
behave in a rational forward-looking manner. In fact, they report a λ coefficient equal to one:  
the growth rate of state and local spending on non-durable items is exclusively determined by 
the current level of resources. By contrast, Dalhberg and Lindström (1998), drawing on a 
                                                 
7 The literature examining the dynamic aspects of local budgeting is much broader but does not deal with the 
issues that concern us here. Buettner and Wildasin (2006), Solé-Ollé and Sorribas-Navarro (2011) and Craig and 
Hoang (2011) estimate dynamic responses to different types of shocks but do not focus on the difference 
between permanent and transitory shocks. Other papers studying the fiscal adjustment of sub-national budgets 
include Poterba (1994) and Rattso and Tovmo (2002). Holtz-Eakin et al. (1989) and Dalhberg and Johansson 
(1998) focus on the causality between revenues and expenditures. 
8 It is tempting to suggest that the bias will be positive (i.e. shocks in current revenues correlate with innovations 
to ‘permanent income’). However, there are also reasons to expect the opposite. First, as Campbell and Mankiw 
(1990) show, even in the case of private consumption, the bias can be negative, depending on the stochastic 
properties of income. Second, in the case of government consumption, the prediction of the bias is more 
complex, since it also depends on the kind of policy response to the revenue shock (see, for example, Holtz-
Eakin et al., 1994, and Donovan, 2009, for a discussion). All papers that have estimated this equation using 
public spending data find evidence of a negative bias. 
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 sample of 265 Swedish municipalities, report a λ coefficient of around 0.1, a figure that they 
attribute to the different methodology employed (individual vs. aggregate data). However, 
Borge and Tovmo (2009), with a sample of 411 Norwegian local governments, estimate an 
average λ coefficient of 0.4. And more recently, Donovan (2009) has re-estimated the λ-
model for a sample of 506 US cities, finding a higher value for λ (of around 0.6). 
 
3.2. The effect of the housing boom 
One of the main shortcomings of the λ model is that it operates as a black-box, insofar as a 
significant estimate of λ can be interpreted not only as evidence of ‘myopia’, but also as the 
result of other causes such as credit constraints or risk-hedging (see, e.g., Luengo-Prado and 
Sorensen, 2008). Thus, today the parameter λ is typically interpreted as a measure of ‘excess 
sensitivity’ of consumption to predictable income changes (relative to the non effect of a fully 
forward-looking behavior), but not necessarily as indicative of the presence of irrationality.  
Studies examining local spending data have also evolved in this direction. Holtz-Eakin 
et al. (1994) do not discuss why their results should suggest that US politicians are completely 
non-forward looking. Dalhberg and Lindström (1998) provide some evidence that the value of 
λ might differ in line with such factors as  geography or the time period, but they do not link 
these results to any particular theory. More recently, Borge and Tovmo’s (2009) study was 
explicitly designed to disentangle two potential explanations for this type of behavior: credit-
constraints and the short-sighted fiscal behavior of fragmented coalition governments. They 
find variation in the λ parameter that ranges from 0 to 0.4 depending on the prevalence of 
these traits. Donovan (2009) also looks at the possible causes of this behavior, finding values 
of λ between 0 and 0.8, depending on institutional traits such as debt constraints, term limits, 
citizen initiatives or partisanship. In this paper we forward an alternative explanation (one not 
previously discussed in the literature) for the ‘excess sensitivity’ of local government 
consumption to revenue changes. We suggest that the sensitivity of spending to (predictable) 
revenue changes might increase in periods of very rapid revenue growth, such as the recent 
housing boom. Below we discuss two possible explanations, a Political economy explanation 
and one based on Behavioral arguments. We also discuss whether we are able to draw any 
conclusions regarding the effect on spending of increases in a given revenue source (i.e., 
Housing construction revenues). 
10
 Political economy arguments. There are several political economy models that might be 
able to generate short-sighted fiscal policies and which are, at the same time, consistent with 
such behavior becoming more intensified with a revenue boom. Here we identify two that 
might be considered most pertinent to our case. First, according to Alesina et al. (2010), 
short-sighted fiscal policy might be the result of agency problems. In their model, voters face 
corrupt governments that can appropriate part of the revenues for unproductive consumption. 
Although voters can replace politicians that take too much in rents, they are unable to 
eliminate political rents completely. Furthermore, voters lack information about the amount of 
debt the government accumulates, so when they see the economy booming they do not 
believe the government is going to save these revenues and they demand higher utility for 
themselves in the form of higher spending. Thus, in the terms of the authors, ‘pro-cyclical’ 
fiscal policy (i.e. an increase in government spending during booms and excessive 
government borrowing) arises from voters’ demands. Fiscal policies are not forward-looking, 
but voters are completely rational, since this is the only way to ‘starve the Leviathan’. The 
authors admit that such behavior could be present at any time, but they stress that it might 
well be exacerbated by a revenue boom.  
Second, the lack of forward-looking behavior could be the result of different social 
groups fighting for a share of public spending, as common-pool models of budgeting have 
pointed out (e.g. Von Hagen and Harden, 1995). Several authors suggest that a revenue boom 
might amplify this effect. This is the so-called ‘voracity effect’ (see, for example, Tornell and 
Lane, 1998 and 1999; Talvi and Vegh, 2005). When there is a huge increase in transitory 
revenues it is difficult for a government not to spend them given that large surpluses fuel the 
spending demands of different social groups. Under such circumstances, controlling spending 
becomes especially difficult, since the finance minister cannot argue that ‘there is no money’ 
to reject the petitions of ministers and agencies. There is evidence from some countries that 
the huge increases in revenues that followed the rise in oil and commodity prices were 
translated into huge increases in spending (see, for example, Lane, 2003). The housing boom 
might have had similar effects on the spending decisions of Spanish municipalities.  
Behavioral arguments. It is held that neither voters nor politicians are able to forecast 
future revenues correctly, especially in hump-shaped cycles. Some recent studies in 
macroeconomics show that the behavior of a range of economic variables is consistent with 
agents that have formed their expectations using overly-simplified models of the economy. 
These models suffer from ‘extrapolative bias’, in the sense that future values are excessively 
11
 based on the most recent evolution of a variable, and so they fail to account sufficiently for 
the fact that good or bad times will not last forever. For example, Fuster et al. (2010) coin the 
term ‘natural expectations’ to describe the formation of expectations as a weighted average 
between ‘rational expectations’ and ‘intuitive expectations’, which are forecasts based on 
these over-simplified models of the economy. This behavior generates systematic forecasting 
errors, which are typically negative during periods of boom (individuals are pessimistic and 
continue to extrapolate the changes experienced in the earlier period of bust) and positive 
during the bust (agents are optimistic and continue to expect the growth enjoyed during the 
last phase of the boom)9. Fuster et al. (2010) survey evidence of this kind of behavior for 
different sectors, and report many examples for the housing sector. Indeed, ‘irrational 
expectations’ have been shown to exist among housing consumers and builders during the 
boom (see, for example, Shiller, 2000; Case and Shiller, 2003)10. Thus, local governments 
may well have come to hold similar sorts of expectations to those held by other agents; after 
all, they are also key actors in land development, being responsible for the design of zoning 
regulations (see Solé-Ollé and Viladecans, 2012) and, thus, for the decision to permit more 
development to take place11. Forward-looking agents update their spending decisions as these 
errors are revealed, increasing spending if the error is negative (during the boom) and 
decreasing spending if the error is positive (during the bust). If the growth in revenue 
correlates with the magnitude of the forecasting errors then the result will be an increase in 
the sensitivity of spending to revenue changes (see, for example, Giamboni et al., 2010). 
Housing construction revenues. The theories discussed above are consistent with a 
greater sensitivity of local spending to revenue changes in periods (places) in which revenues 
are growing fastest. But, should we also expect current changes in certain specific revenues 
(i.e., those related to housing construction) to have a greater effect on spending than others? 
In principle, this effect is not expected if politicians are fully forward-looking agents. 
However, our conclusion might change if they behave differently. For example, adopting a 
behavioral perspective, Shefrin and Thaler (1988) provide a theoretical rationale for short-
                                                 
9 We are unable to measure the revenue forecasting errors for each municipality. However, aggregate budget and 
outlay data for the revenue derived from Housing construction taxes indicate that forecasting error were indeed 
negative during the boom, ranging from 2 to 4% of the budget between 1995 and 2001 and from 4 to 7% 
between 2002 and 2006, and positive during the bust (13% in 2006 and 30% in 2007).  
10 See also Himmelberg et al. (2005) and Glaeser et al. (2010) for evidence of the role of ‘irrational behavior’ in 
explaining the recent boom and bust in housing prices. 
11 For instance, local governments also passed more expansive land use plans (converting huge amounts of land 
from rural to urban use) as the housing boom increased in intensity. The ‘irrational’ behavior of these plans is 
apparent from the fact that a large proportion of this land today stands vacant (see Solé-Ollé and Viladecans, 
2010).  
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 sighted behavior based on research conducted in psychology12. They show that ‘excess 
sensitivity’ of consumption out of current income can occur because of a lack of willpower 
and self-control, which enhance the temptation to consume from current income at the 
expense of the rational choice of smoothing consumption over the life-cycle. According to 
these authors, current income, wealth, and future income are located in different mental 
accounts, the propensity to spend out of current income being higher than that for wealth, 
which is in turn higher than that for future income. Moreover, in their theory, consumers have 
a different propensity to consume out of different income sources. For instance, in our case, 
revenue sources, which are classified as extraordinary or irregular, are placed in a different 
mental account and are not consumed in the same proportion as ordinary or regular sources of 
revenue. So, in principle, and since Housing construction revenues are markedly irregular (the 
taxable item not being recurrent and revenues varying considerably from one year to the 
next), they would probably be kept in a different mental account and saved in a higher 
proportion, even if there are no formal budgetary requirements to do so13. Thus, in normal 
times, we can expect the sensitivity of spending to changes in Housing construction revenues 
to be lower than that for other types of revenue. Likewise, in normal times, we should also 
expect municipalities that rely more heavily on the construction industry for their revenues to 
have a lower propensity to spend out of their current revenues.  
However, the period that concerns us here can hardly be described as ‘normal times’. As 
we have seen in the previous section, the trend in local revenues during these years (and, 
especially, after 2001) was quite simply spectacular. In such a situation, local governments 
might have convinced themselves that Housing construction revenues would continue to grow 
at these high rates into the future. Thus, as the boom intensified, it is conceivable that 
Housing construction revenues would have been progressively shifted from the irregular or 
extraordinary ‘mental account’ to the current one, which would have increased the propensity 
to spend out of these revenues.  
 
                                                 
12 See Hines and Thaler (1995) for an application of the mental accounts theory to explain the ‘flypaper effect’. 
See also Heyndels and Van Driessche (2002) for an application to account for the effect of different types of 
windfall.   
13 Other differences between these revenues and Ordinary revenues might influence the tendency to over-spend 
out of them. For instance, Construction taxes are indirect taxes that are usually shifted to the consumers and 
which are not particularly salient as they reflect the net price of a house. Furthermore, they are not recurrent, so 
their degree of visibility is low. However, it is not clear that these traits make this type of windfall less visible 
than those derived from Grants or from automatic increases in the tax bases of Ordinary taxes (see, for example,  
Ladd, 1993, and Henydels and Van Driessche, 2002).  
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 4. Econometrics and data 
4.1. Econometric framework 
A more general specification of equation (2), which takes into account the panel structure of 
the data, would be: 
                                                ituitRitZtitC +Δ++=Δ λβη '                                               (3) 
where tη  are year fixed effects, controlling for time-varying interest rates, and itZ  is a vector 
of control variables, controlling for differences in preferences. We might also consider the 
possibility of controlling for municipality fixed effects. Various authors do not, in fact, 
consider this necessary, given that the variables have already been differentiated (Dalhberg 
and Lindstrom, 1998), while others do but report no great effect on their results (Borge and 
Tovmo, 2009). In our case, a Wald test indicated that the municipality fixed effects were not 
jointly statistically significant so we did not include them in the equation. Furthermore, by 
controlling for year fixed effects and several control variables, other types of geographical 
fixed effects (by region and by housing market) were not statistically significant. 
The main problem to be derived from the estimation of equation (3) is that tRΔ might 
be correlated with the innovation in permanent revenues, biasing the estimation of λ. As 
explained earlier, the direction of the bias cannot be guessed, so resolving the problem 
requires the use of instrumental variables techniques. Since the error term in (3) is the 
innovation to ‘permanent revenues’, variables dated t-1 or earlier should not be correlated 
with ‘permanent revenues’ and as such are potentially good instruments. There are, however, 
practical reasons for not using the first lag: (i) current spending might include spending on 
durables and the dynamics of capital spending are much more complex (see Holtz-Eakin and 
Rosen, 1993), (ii) budget decisions might be sluggish, reflecting incrementalism.  
Thus, we estimate the equation using the GMM method developed by Holtz-Eakin et al. 
(1988), lagging by at least two periods the increases in both current revenues and current 
spending. When estimating the equation with the breakdown of current revenues, we also lag 
the increases in the different revenue sources by two or more periods. In line with Campbell 
and Mankiw (1990), we also use the twice-lagged instrument of operating savings (i.e. R-C). 
The reason for including this instrument (in addition to the lags of spending increases) is 
simply to increase the explanatory power of the instruments. Furthermore, so as to avoid 
instrument proliferation (see Bowsher, 2002), we restrict the maximum number of lags to six. 
To assess the validity of these instruments we use the Hansen test and the Arellano and Bond 
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 autocorrelation tests. Finally, note that we report the first-stage GMM results with standard 
errors corrected for heteroskedasticity and that the second-stage results (available upon request) 
differ little from those of the first stage.  
4.2. Sample and variables.  
Sample. We estimate these equations for the period 1994 to 2006 with data taken from 
Spanish municipalities with more than 5,000 residents. The sample period is determined by 
data availability - 1994 was the first year the Spanish Ministry of Economics supplied micro 
data on municipal budget outlays and 2006 was the last year data were available when this 
study was initiated (coinciding with the peak in the housing boom – the period which interests 
us here). The original database includes most municipalities with a population greater than 
5,000 residents and a representative sample of smaller municipalities. However, as the 
smallest municipalities included vary each year, this means there are a considerable number 
of gaps in the database. This would clearly impair the quality of the dynamic GMM estimator 
we use. For this reason, we focus only on municipalities with more than 5,000 residents, 
which nevertheless accounts for more than 90% of the Spanish population. Yet, even though 
we use these larger municipalities, the panel remains unbalanced. The average number of 
observations per municipality is seven; the maximum is ten. We have discarded the 
municipalities without at least five consecutive observations. As a result, the number of 
observations grows over time (i.e. 931 in 1994; 1,024 in 2001; and 1,256 in 2006). We also 
undertook the estimation with a balanced panel, but the results do not change.  
Dependent variable. The dependent variable is the increase in current spending 
excluding interest payments (see Table A.1 in the appendix for definitions and data sources). 
This includes spending on personnel, purchases and transfers, and provides a good match with 
the definition of ‘non-durable consumption’ adopted in the literature. The revenue variables 
adopted are used as previously defined (see Table A.1 for details). Both spending and 
revenues have been divided by lagged current revenues. Even if the theory holds for levels, 
some scaling of the variables is required so as to avoid any problems arising from the log-
linearity of the current spending and revenue variables (see Campbell and Mankiw, 1990).  
Previous studies scale the variables by employing them in growth rates (see Dalhberg and 
Lindstrom, 1998) and justify this choice by noting that equation (1) should hold in logs under 
specific assumptions about the utility function and the evolution of interest rates (Hansen and 
Singleton, 1983). Both approaches work equally well, but scaling using lagged current 
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 revenues has the advantage here of facilitating the estimation of the effects for different 
revenue sources when also using a linear equation. Whatever the case, in our discussion of 
robustness (see below), we also examine results obtained when using alternative scaling 
methods, including growth rates and per capita figures. 
Control variables. The list of control variables includes: % younger than 18, % older 
than 65, % unemployed, % educated, log(population), log(land area), Δlog(population) and 
Δ% unemployed. These variables control either for differences in time preferences and/or for 
the growth in private income. We do not control for the amount of capital spending since 
many papers have shown that there is evidence that durable and non-durable goods are 
separable in the utility function (see, for example, Holtz-Eakin et al., 1994) and because in 
our case capital spending cannot be considered an exogenous variable.   
Splitting the sample. In order to investigate whether the intensification of the housing boom 
increased spending sensitivity to revenue changes, we split the sample in two ways. First, we 
provide a separate analysis for the years before and after 2001. Figure 1 suggests that the 
trend in Housing construction revenues accelerates after this year. Second, we divide our 
sample into two, using as our criteria: (i) the growth rate in Current revenues in the housing 
market where the municipality lies; (ii) the growth rate in real housing prices in that housing 
market14,15. For practical reasons (i.e. information on housing prices and permits is only 
available at this level of aggregation), we use the 50 Spanish provinces (Eurostat NUTS III 
regions) to identify our housing markets. The provinces identified in (ii) are either those along 
the Mediterranean coast, or those that include or share a border with the main urban areas 
outside the Mediterranean coast, namely Madrid, Zaragoza, and Bilbao16. We refer to this 
sub-sample as Coastal and Urban housing markets17. Criterion (i) does not include exactly 
the same provinces, with some of the above excluded and others included, but the correlation 
between both criteria is high. We have run simple regressions between log(Current revenues) 
and three dummies: (i) equal to one for coastal and urban housing markets, (ii) equal to one 
                                                 
14 The idea here is that even if a particular municipality is not experiencing development growth in a particular 
year or period, voters and politicians would expect this to happen in the future if municipalities in the same 
housing market had this experience in the recent past. Shiller (2000) shows that ‘irrational expectations’ 
regarding the evolution of housing prices affect also individuals that live in place that have still to be affected by 
the price increases. See also Decoster and Strange (2010) for an analysis of herding behavior among developers. 
15 We also did the same exercise using the growth rate in housing permits, with exactly the same municipalities 
classified in the two groups. 
16 The other big urban areas (i.e. Barcelona, Valencia, Málaga and Sevilla) are in the Mediterranean coast.  
17 Real housing price appreciation between 1994 and 2006 was 190% and 90% in these two samples, 
respectively. The top three housing markets were Malaga, Tarragona and Baleares (all in the Mediterranean 
coast) where real houses prices grew by 274%. The bottom three housing markets were Teruel, Ourense and 
Soria (all rural areas of the interior of Spain) with real house price appreciation of 47%.  
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 for years after 2001, and (iii) an interaction between the two dummies. The R2 of this 
regression is 0.57 and the three coefficients are statistically significant at the 99% level, after 
clustering the standard errors at the provincial level. The results indicate that Current 
revenues grew in real terms at an average growth rate of 4.7% and 2.6% over the period 1996 
to 2001 in Coastal and Urban municipalities and in the rest of the sample, respectively. These 
growth rates climbed to 8.2% and 5.9% during the period 2002 to 2006. We can conclude, 
therefore, that the differences between the revenue trends of these groups are statistically 
significant. 
 
5. Results 
Tables 2 to 5 show our results. In Table 2 we display our basic results when estimating 
spending sensitivity to revenue changes for the full period and for the sample of 
municipalities, and without allowing for the effects to depend on revenue structure. Table 3 
shows the results when we analyze the two sub-periods, 1997-2001 and 2002-2006, and the 
sub-samples of municipalities (based on housing market growth rates) separately. Table 4 
presents the results when allowing the degree of forward-looking behavior to differ according 
to growth in either Ordinary revenues or Housing construction revenues. Finally, Table 5 
reports the results when analyzing the effects of the different types of revenue on the several 
samples introduced in Table 3 (i.e., sub-periods and different types of housing market). 
5.1. Basic results 
The first two columns in Table 2 show the OLS results. Column one includes the year fixed 
effects and column two adds a full set of control variables. The third and fourth columns 
present the GMM results. Column three includes the year fixed effects only and column four 
adds the control variables. In all cases the coefficient of the increase in Current revenues is 
positive and statistically significant, and the inclusion of the control variables does not alter 
the results (be it in the OLS or in the GMM estimates). Hansen’s J test suggests that the 
instruments are exogenous, and this is corroborated by the Arellano and Bond autocorrelation 
tests (Arellano and Bond, 1991). The GMM coefficients are twice as high as the OLS 
estimates, suggesting that Spain’s local governments depart substantially from a fully 
forward-looking behavior. The GMM coefficient has a value of around 0.6, which is similar 
to the average estimates reported in a number of recent papers (Borge and Tovmo, 2009; 
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 Donovan, 2009). The negative bias of the OLS results is also in accordance with findings 
elsewhere in the literature. 
[Insert Table 2] 
5.2. Housing boom intensity 
Table 3 analyzes whether these previous results are related to the intensity of the housing 
construction boom. The first two columns present the results for two different periods: 1997-
2001 and 2002-2006. The tests suggest that the empirical specification works well 
irrespective of the period under analysis. The results are also qualitatively similar for both 
periods: the spending of the Spanish municipalities is more sensitive to revenue changes in all 
these years. Note, however, that the sensitivity was greater between 2002 and 2006 than it 
was in the earlier period (i.e., coefficient of current revenues of 0.86 compared to that of 0.6), 
which is consistent with the belief that the acceleration in the housing boom underpinned the 
tendency of Spanish governments to behave in a manner that was not forward-looking.  
[Insert Table 3] 
The next four columns in Table 3 present the results for two sub-samples of 
municipalities according to the growth rates of their housing markets. Columns three and four 
show the results when the sample is divided according to the growth rate recorded by Housing 
construction revenues (“high” indicates that the growth rate in the particular housing market 
was above the median for the country, while “low” indicates that it was below the median). 
The last two columns show results for Coastal & Urban municipalities (i.e., those lying in 
dynamic housing markets, located in coastal or in high-growth, non-coastal, urban areas) and 
for all other municipalities. The results obtained are the same in both cases, and are even more 
extreme than those presented in the first two columns (sample divided by sub-period). 
Spending sensitivity is much higher in the High-growth sample than it is in that of Low-
growth (i.e., coefficient of current revenues of 0.83 compared to that of 0.49). It is also much 
higher in the Coastal & urban sample than it is in the rest of the municipalities (i.e., 
coefficient of 0.84 compared to that of 0.46). Thus, these results suggest that it was the 
intensity of the housing boom that was responsible for the increased divergence shown in 
Spain’s local spending decisions from any forward-looking behavior. 
5.3. Housing construction revenues  
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 Table 4 shows the results when different revenue sources are allowed to have different effects 
on spending. Here, likewise, the tests used support our specification in all cases. Column one 
analyzes the effects of Ordinary revenues and Housing-construction revenues separately, 
while column two breaks Ordinary revenues down into Current grant revenues and Tax 
revenues. Our main finding is that an increase in Ordinary revenues has a much greater 
impact on spending than an increase in Housing construction revenues, the coefficients being 
around 0.75 and 0.16, respectively. As explained above, Housing construction revenues are 
extraordinary revenues, comprising chiefly taxes and fees whose payment is non-recurrent. It 
is, therefore, not entirely surprising that local governments are more forward-looking when 
they spend out of such revenues. Our other finding is that the effect of Current grants is 
greater than that of Tax revenues. However, although the point estimate is higher for Current 
grants (0.87 vs. 0.71) a Wald test is not able to reject the equality of both coefficients 
(χ2(1)=0.29, p-value=0.587). Columns three and four in Table 4 include, as additional 
variables, the revenues derived from the Capital budget. In theory, these revenues should not 
be used to fund current spending; in practice, however, the effect is uncertain, given the 
possibility of reducing the levels of operating savings in response to an increase in capital 
revenues. Our results do not support this hypothesis: neither aggregate Capital revenues nor 
its components (i.e. Capital grants and Capital housing-construction revenues) have an 
impact on current spending. Additional results (not shown here for reasons of space) for a 
sample of municipalities presenting positive operating savings show coefficients that present 
the same sign and, in the case of capital grants, values that are a litter higher and statistically 
significant at the 10% level. This negative coefficient would appear to imply that more capital 
grants force municipalities to reduce their current spending so that they might raise their 
savings and adhere to the matching requirements that are typical of many capital grants. 
However, the results do not support the idea that revenues derived from Sales of land plots are 
used to fund increases in current spending. This result is important since, as we have shown in 
section 2, these specific revenues are those that grew the most during the boom (recall Figure 
2). It is reassuring to know that these revenues were allocated to either deficit reduction or 
investment.  
[Insert Tables 4 and 5] 
Table 5 shows how the results for the different revenue sources change when we divide 
the sample according to the same indicators of housing boom intensity used in Table 3. As in 
Table 3, the effect of changes in revenue on local spending increases with the intensity of the 
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 boom. Note, however, that this increase is small in the case of Ordinary revenues (the 
coefficients increase by about 0.17 between sub-periods), but very high in the case of Housing 
construction revenues, where the value of the coefficient is multiplied by four. Thus, even 
though local governments sought not to spend much from these revenues (after all, they were 
still extraordinary), the restraint typically applied was weakened as the housing boom 
intensified. Note also that the effect of increases in Housing construction revenues is very 
high in the High growth and Coastal & Urban subsamples of municipalities. The coefficient 
of Housing construction revenues is very high in these places (0.7-0.9 vs 0.15-0.16), and is in 
fact very similar to that found for Ordinary revenues (0.7-0.8 vs 0.9). 
Our results suggest that in those housing markets where the boom has been most 
intense, the typical restraint applied in the management of extraordinary revenues derived 
from housing construction has been largely abandoned, given that the sensitivity of spending 
to changes in these revenues is very similar to that in traditionally more stable sources. In 
other housing markets, where construction rates and housing prices have grown more slowly, 
local governments still exercise some restraint when determining the proportion of these 
extraordinary revenues that should go to fund increases in current spending. 
Additional results. In this section we discuss some additional results, albeit that for 
reasons of space we omit any tables (results available upon request). First, we replicated the 
results of the effect of aggregate increases in Current revenues, computing this and the 
dependent variable both as growth rates and in per capita terms. In both cases, the results are 
virtually indistinguishable from those presented above. Second, we replicated the estimations 
reported in Tables 3 to 5 for each year in the period 1997 to 2006; the sensitivity of spending 
to changes in Current revenues as well as to that in Housing construction revenues presents a 
U-shaped curve. Thus, while sensitivity was high between 1997 and 1999, it fell between 
2000 and 2001, becoming higher again after this year before rising steeply until the end of the 
period. The shape is similar to that displayed by both Building permits and Housing 
construction revenues in Figure 1. It would seem that the degree of over-spending is related to 
the intensity of the housing boom. We also divided the sample into four additional sub-
samples, one for each quartile of the variable used in the earlier division (be it Current 
revenues or Housing prices). The coefficient obtained for Housing construction revenues is 
zero in the lower quartile, around 0.1 and not statistically significant in the second quartile, 
around 0.3 and significant in the third quartile, and around 0.8 and very similar to that 
obtained for Ordinary revenues in the top quartile. This reinforces the finding that the 
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 sensitivity of spending to revenue changes has been higher in markets experiencing a more 
intense boom. 
Finally, we performed some additional analyses in order to rule out the possibility that 
our findings are due to credit constraints. Spanish local governments are subject to debt 
limitations, credit authorizations from higher tiers of government being denied if either the 
debt burden and/or the level of debt are too high with respect to current revenues. 
Furthermore, during the years 2001, 2002 and 2003, an additional regulation (the so-called 
‘Law of Budget Stability’) forbade the use of credit to fund additional spending increases 
(current or capital), with new debt only being allowed in order to refinance old debt. 
Following the 2004 national elections, the new left-wing government abolished this rule. Our 
results by year (as discussed above) do not indicate that this new law had any effect, since the 
degree of spending sensitivity to revenue changes actually fell in 2001, and while it did 
increase in 2002 and 2003, this formed part of a more substantial increase recorded in the 
years to come, once the regulation was no longer in force. Other authors similarly conclude 
that this law was not effectively enforced, at least outside the largest cities (see Solé-Ollé and 
Sorribas-Navarro, 2012). However, what this analysis cannot rule out is the general effect of 
the more basic regulations governing spending sensitivity to changes in revenue. To analyze 
this possibility, we follow Borge and Tovmo (2008) and divide the sample of municipalities 
into (i) those with high and low per capita revenues, (ii) those with high and low operating 
surplus as a percentage of current revenues, and (iii) those with high and low debt burden as a 
percentage of revenues. If credit constraints apply, spending sensitivity should be higher in 
municipalities with low revenues, and/or low operating surplus, and/or low debt burden than 
in the rest of the municipalities. Yet, in most cases we find that there are no differences 
between the two groups, and in some we actually find just that the differences go in direction 
opposite to what we expected. We can conclude, therefore, that Spanish municipalities were 
not under any credit constraints during this period. We consider this result to be reasonable, 
given the wide availability of credit in Spain during this period. 
6. Conclusions 
We have examined the budgetary behavior of Spanish local governments during the last 
housing boom (1997-2006), a period characterized by rapid growth in housing construction 
revenues. We have argued that this revenue growth might account for the increase in the 
sensitivity of local government spending to (predictable) revenue changes. We have estimated 
the degree of sensitivity of local spending to (predictable) changes in revenues, following the 
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 method adopted by Holtz-Eakin et al. (1994). The main findings of the paper are: (i) Local 
spending shows considerable sensitivity to predictable changes in revenues, suggesting that 
Spanish local governments did not behave as fully forward-looking agents. (ii) Their 
departure from this benchmark increased as the last housing boom intensified. Indeed, we 
have found evidence that spending sensitivity to revenue changes was greater a) after 2001 
(when the upward trends in housing construction and housing prices was at their steepest) and 
b) in housing markets in which Current revenues and Housing prices grew most. (iii) This 
spending sensitivity was not as great in housing construction revenues as it was in ordinary 
revenues, but the difference was reduced as the boom intensified. Our results, therefore, seem 
to confirm some of the pessimistic predictions made by both Spanish scholars and the press 
about the effects of the housing boom on the budgets of local governments. While the claim 
that housing-construction revenues are always especially ‘tempting’ would appear to be 
unfounded, we have found that, in some cases (during the last few years of the boom and in 
Coastal and Urban housing markets which experienced high rates of price appreciation), 
these revenues are at least as ‘equally tempting’ as those derived from Ordinary revenues 
(i.e., Ordinary taxes and Current grants). However, there is one key difference between these 
revenue sources: while Ordinary revenues have not undergone any substantial drop as a result 
of the recession, Housing construction revenues have as good as vanished, leaving a hole in 
the revenue budget that has forced municipal governments to make extremely hard choices in 
an attempt to adjust their budgets to the new situation. Further analysis is required to 
determine just how the adjustment is being carried out. 
The only comfort to be drawn from our results is that the largest component making up 
the revenue bubble generated by the housing boom, namely the revenues derived from Sales 
of land plots, did not have any impact whatsoever on current spending, as it was confined 
entirely within the capital budget. This does not mean, however, that all this revenue was used 
to reduce municipal debt; rather a considerable proportion was used to fund capital 
investments. This is assumed not to be entirely negative, since investment can be readily 
adjusted in times of recession. And yet, there is some evidence that investment projects can 
create hidden burdens for municipalities, in terms of the higher maintenance costs they incur 
and the higher level of current spending required to run the facilities. The idea has also been 
forwarded that investment can improve local amenities and, thus, foster future growth. 
However, little is known about the quality of the investment projects undertaken during 
revenue booms and it is conceivable that their selection may be less rigorous.  
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 Finally, although we believe that the paper provides evidence to indicate that the 
housing revenue boom did result in a certain relaxation of local government spending 
controls, we are unable to state whether this was attributable to political economic forces or to 
the ‘bubble psychology’. Future studies will be required to disentangle these effects. 
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Figure 1: 
Housing construction revenues vs Building permits  
and Housing prices.  Spain, 1994-2010. Year 1994=100. 
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Notes: (1) Housing construction revenues expressed in real terms (See Table 
A.1 for a definition). (2) Building permits = ‘viviendas iniciadas’. (3) Housing 
prices = price/m2 of new houses, in real terms. (4) Housing construction 
revenues and building permits are plotted on the left axis, housing prices on 
the right. 
Source: Ministerio de Fomento (www.fomento.es) and Ministerio de 
Economía y Hacienda (www.minhac.es). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2: 
Breakdown of housing construction revenues. 
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 Spain, 1994-2006. Year 1994=100 
 
Notes: (1) See Table A.1 for the definitions of each item. (2) Data on 
the breakdown of housing construction revenues only available for the 
period 1994-2006 
   Source: Ministerio de Economía y Hacienda (www. Minhac .es). 
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Table 1: 
Share of housing construction revenues over  
non-financial municipal revenues, 1994 and 2006 (in %) 
    
  1994 2006 
Ordinary revenues 80.82 70.37 
 Ordinary taxes and fees 46.82 40.05 
 Transfers (current) 33.98 30.32 
Extraordinary revenues 19.18 28.94 
 Housing construction revenues 11.76 21.27 
 Housing construction taxes 5.39 9.05 
 Housing construction fees 4.15 5.62 
 Sales of land plots 2.22 6.60 
 Transfers (capital) 7.42 7.67 
  100.00 100.00 
Notes: (1) See Table A.1 for definitions and data sources; (2) Outlay data.  
Source: Ministerio de Economía y Hacienda (www.minhac.es), Base de datos de 
liquidaciones de los presupuestos de las Entidades Locales. 
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Table 2:  
Forward-looking behavior in local budgeting. Basic results. 
Dependent variable: Growth in current spending, ΔCt 
 OLS GMM 
(i) (ii) (iii) (iv) 
ΔCurrent revenues: ΔRt 0.273 
(19.95)*** 
0.272   
(19.90)*** 
0.638 
(4.88)*** 
0.606 
(4.98)*** 
R2 0.128 0.131 --.-- --.-- 
F-stat./ Wald (all variables) 55.44[0.000] 51.67[0.000] 75.20[0.000] 74.33 [0.000] 
Arellano-Bond AR(1) test 
 --.-- --.-- 
-5.99 [0.000] -7.04 [0.000] 
Arellano-Bond AR(2) test 
 --.-- --.-- 
1.32 [0.230] 1.23 [0.221] 
Hansen’s J. stat.  
(over-identification) --.-- --.-- 
12.53 [0.325] 12.61 [0.311] 
Year fixed effects YES YES YES YES 
Control variables NO YES NO YES 
  
 Notes:  (1) Sample: 1,256 Spanish municipalities 1994 to 2006 (nº of obs. = 8,682). (2) 
Unbalanced panel: average number of observations per municipality is 7, the maximum being 
10 (the full period covers 13 years, i.e. 1994-2006, but 3 years are lost because of instrument 
selection in the GMM estimation; OLS uses the same sample as that used in GMM. (3) t-
statistics in parenthesis; p-values in brackets; ***, ** & * = statistically significant at the 99, 
95 and 90% levels. (4) Robust standard errors. (5) Control variables include: % younger than 
18, % older than 65, % unemployed, % educated, log(population) and Δlog(population), see 
Table 2 for the definition and sources of the variables. (6) F-stat./Wald  (all variables) =OLS 
and GMM tests of joint statistical significance of all variables; (7) Excluded instruments lags 
t-2 to t-6 of the differences in spending and revenues (i.e. ΔC and ΔR) and savings, (R-C), 
lagged t-2. (8) AR(1) and AR(2): Arellano and Bond tests of residual auto-correlation. (9) 
Hansen’s J over-identification statistic, distributed as a χ2(n), with n= number of over-
identifying constraints. 
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Table 3:  
Forward-looking behavior and housing boom intensity.  
 Dependent variable: Growth in current spending, ΔCt. GMM estimation 
 (a)  By sub-period  (b)  By revenue growth (c)  By type of market 
 1997-
2001 
2002-
2006 Low High Other 
Coastal  
& Urban 
(i) (ii) (iii) (iv) (v) (vi)
 ΔCurrent revenues: ΔRt 
 
0.600 
(3.46)*** 
0.863 
(4.81)*** 
0.488 
(2.58) *** 
0.831 
(3.71) *** 
0.465 
(2.67) *** 
0.844 
(5.35)*** 
 F-stat./ Wald (all variables) 14.22 [0.007] 30.49[0.007] 56.45[0.007] 113.89[0.000] 75.27 [0.007] 60.54[0.000] 
Arellano-Bond AR(1) test 
 
-4.55 [0.000] -3.16 [0.000] -5.60 [0.000] -3.95 [0.000] -7.78 [0.000] -7.84 [0.000] 
Arellano-Bond AR(2) test 
 
0.57 [0.556] 0.27 [0.786] 1.11 [0.267] 1.33 [0.184] 1.18 [0.238] 0.72 [0.469] 
Hansen’s J. stat.  
(over-identification) 
15.23 [0.272] 17.28[0.368] 13.22[0.263] 10.69[0.297] 15.26 [0.361] 15.32[0.221] 
Year fixed effects YES YES YES YES YES YES
Control variables YES YES YES YES YES YES
   
 Notes:  (1) Period 1994-2001: 1,024 municipalities and 4,139 obs.; Period 2002-2006: 1,256 municipalities and 
4,543 obs. (2) High (Low) means above (below) the median value of the Revenue Growth variable for the full 
period. (3) The Coastal & Urban subsample includes 879 municipalities and the Other subsample 355.  (4) See 
Tables 2 and 3. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
30
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 4:  
Forward-looking behavior and housing construction revenues.  
Dependent variable: Growth in current spending, ΔCt. GMM estimation 
 (a)  
Ordinary vs Housing 
const. revenues 
(b)  
Housing const. 
revenues in the capital 
(i) (ii) (iv) (v) 
 Δ Ordinary revenues: ΔOt 
 
0.748 
(4.75)*** 
--.-- --.-- --.-- 
     Δ Current grant revenues: ΔCGt 
 
--.-- 0.868 
(3.53)*** 
0.837 
(3.85)*** 
0.835 
(4.16)*** 
     Δ Tax revenues: ΔTt 
 
--.-- 0.713 
(3.50)*** 
0.738 
(3.78)*** 
0.741 
(3.87)*** 
 Δ Housing construction revenues: ΔHt 
 
0.156 
(2.64)*** 
0.143 
(2.37)*** 
0.136 
(1.64) * 
0.137 
(1.78)* 
Δ Capital revenues: ΔKt 
 
--.-- --.-- -0.054 
(-0.75) 
--.-- 
    Δ Capital Housing cons.  revenues: ΔKHt 
 
--.-- --.-- --.-- -0.038 
(-0.53) 
    Δ Capital grant revenues: ΔKGt 
 
--.-- --.-- --.-- -0.102 
(-1.21) 
 Wald (all variables) 104.75[0.000] 203.07[0.000] 215.57 [0.000] 204.31 [0.000] 
Arellano-Bond AR(1) test 
 
-1.70 [0.088] -1.79 [0.073] -1.70 [0.090] -1.66 [0.098] 
Arellano-Bond AR(2) test 
 
1.23 [0.221] 1.52 [0.128] 1.15 [0.248] 1.43 [0.260] 
Hansen’s J. stat. (over-identification) 21.71[0.447] 20.24[0.506] 26.75 [0.423] 30.47 [0.493] 
Year fixed effects YES YES YES YES 
Control variables YES YES YES YES 
  
Notes:  (1) Excluded instruments lags t-2 to t-6 of the differences in spending and the revenue 
categories considered in each equation (e.g. in column i these are: lags t-2 to t-6 of ΔC, ΔO and 
ΔH and the savings to revenues ratio, (R-C), lagged t-2. (2) See Table 3. (3) See Table A.1 for 
definitions of the budget variables. 
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Table 5:  
Forward-looking behavior, housing construction revenues, and housing boom intensity  
Dependent variable: Growth in current spending, ΔCt. GMM estimation 
 (a)  By sub-period  (b)  By revenue growth (c)  By type of market 
 1997-
2001 
2002-
2006 Low High Other 
Coastal  
& Urban 
(i) (ii) (iii) (iv) (v) (vi)
 Δ Ordinary revenues: ΔOt 
 
0.686 
(4.88)*** 
0.853 
(6.94)*** 
0.623 
(3.01)*** 
0.883 
(3.48)*** 
0.638 
(2.78)*** 
0.881 
(4.56)*** 
 Δ Housing construction  
    revenues: ΔHt 
0.113 
(3.70)*** 
0.493 
(3.01)*** 
0.155 
(2.41) ** 
0.700 
(2.17)** 
0.168 
(2.72) ** 
0.772 
(2.74)*** 
 Wald (all variables) 237.84 [0.000] 89.38[0.000] 42.03[0.000] 124.74[0.000] 80.33 [0.000] 78.06[0.000] 
Arellano-Bond AR(1) test 
 
-5.76 [0.000] -1.47 [0.142] -5.33 [0.000] -4.13 [0.000] -4.66 [0.000] -7.91 [0.000] 
Arellano-Bond AR(2) test 
 
1.26 [0.189] 1.25 [0.188] 0.71 [0.479] 1.47 [0.142] 0.73 [0.466] 1.51 [0.13] 
Hansen’s J. stat.  
(over-identification) 
17.25 [0.365] 24.95[0.353] 21.45[0.257] 14.775[0.376] 14.04 [0.371] 22.76[0.272] 
Year fixed effects YES YES YES YES YES YES
Control variables YES YES YES YES YES YES
    
   Notes: (1) See Tables 2 and 3 
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 Table A.1: 
Definitions and data sources 
Definitions
Panel (a): Budget data (Source: Ministerio de Economía y Hacienda , 
 “Base de datos de liquidaciones de los presupuestos de las Entidades Locales”) 
Δ Current spending: ΔCt 
 
Yearly increase in current spending / lagged current revenues 
Current spending = Spending on personnel (chapter I)+ 
Spending on purchases (chapter II) + Spending on transfers 
(chapter IV) 
Δ Current revenues: ΔOt 
 
Yearly increase in current revenues / lagged current revenues 
Current revenues = Ordinary revenues + Housing construction 
revenues 
 Δ Ordinary revenues: ΔOt 
 
Yearly increase in ordinary revenues / lagged current revenues 
Ordinary revenues = Ordinary taxes + Current grants   
 Δ Current grant revenues: ΔCGt 
 
Yearly increase in current grants / 
lagged current revenues  
Current grants = Chapter IV of the budget 
 Δ Tax revenues: ΔTt 
 
Yearly increase in ordinary taxes and fees / lagged current 
revenues 
Ordinary taxes = chapters  I & II of the budget – items 114 and 
228 
Ordinary fees = chapter III – items 3.1, 3.6 & 3.9 
 Δ Housing construction revenues: ΔHt 
 
Yearly increase in housing construction revenues / lagged 
current revenues 
Housing construction revenues (excluding those in the capital 
account)= Housing construction taxes + Housing construction 
fees + Developers’ fees  
Housing construction taxes = Construction Tax, item 114, and 
Land value increase tax, item  228)  
Housing construction fees = Impact fees (item 3.6) 
Developers’ fees (items 3.1 & 3.9) 
Δ Capital revenues: ΔKt 
 
Yearly increase in capital revenues / lagged current revenues 
Capital revenues = Sales of land plots + capital grants 
 Δ Capital Housing cons.  revenues: ΔKHt 
 
Yearly increase in sales of land plots / lagged current revenues 
Sales of land plots =  item 6.1 
  Δ Capital grant revenues: ΔKGt 
 
Yearly increase in capital revenues / lagged current revenues 
Capital revenues = chapter VII 
Panel (b): Socio-economic data (Sources: Instituto Nacional de Estadística, INE, www.ine.es  
and  Instituto Nacional de Empleo, INEM, www.inem.es) 
% younger than 18 % of the population less than 18 years old 
% older than 65 % of the population more than 65 years old 
% unemployed % of the population unemployed  
(‘paro registrado’/’población de derecho’) 
% educated % of the population with higher education 
log(population) Resident population (‘población de derecho’) 
log(land area) Land area under the jurisdiction of the municipality in Km
2 
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